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Abstract
The valuation of counterparty risk for single name credit derivatives
requires the computa- tion of joint distributions of default times of two
default-prone entities. For a Merton-type model, we derive some formulas
for these joint distribu- tions. As an application, closed formulas for coun-
terparty risk on a CDS or for a first-to-default swap on two underlyings
are obtained.
1 Introduction
Default Risk has become one of the key issues of contemporary finance. In
practice, default risk computations are directly involved in three, closely con-
nected, but still separated areas: first, the pricing of single and multiname
credit derivatives (ABS, CDS, CDOs...), second, risk valuation for regulatory,
risk management and economic capital valuation purposes, third, rating as-
signements. The present article is focused mainly on the first two aspects of
risk valuation. Notice however that the next generation of rating methodologies
will most probably have to include advanced correlation tools such as the ones
considered here.
Although deriving new formulas for credit derivative transactions on two
assets, our main interest will be on counterparty risk. Once again, this is a
∗Consultant, Zeliade Systems.
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central argument, both for regulatory purposes (counterparty risk was already
a key issue in the Basel 1 agreements, but its relevance and complexity was
emphasized by the later improvements of the set of rules, see e.g. [1, 9, 2]) and
also for practical risk management.
Concretely, the 2007 “subprime” credit crisis has emphasized how a mis-
pricing of counterparty risk could be dangerous. Before the crisis, financial
institutions engaged heavily in credit derivatives transactions for hedging pur-
poses. One of the main side effects of the crisis has been to reveal that their
counterparties were not reliable: monoline insurers (who act traditionaly as
guarantees for municipalities-type bond emissions but engaged more recently in
the ABS business) faced downgrades and/or bankruptcy, whereas some compa-
nies offering CDS protection have also been on the wedge of bankruptcy due
to spread widenings and collateral agreements. In spite of these facts, in the
present state of the art quantitative counterparty risk assessment is still largely
in infancy.
We address here one of the fundamental questions in the field, namely we
introduce a Merton-type model and derive formulas for the joint distributions
of the default events -and other relevant joint probabilities- of two default-prone
entities. Closed formulas for counterparty risk on a CDS transaction or for a
first-to-default swap on two underlyings follow.
Notice that we refrain to seek for the outmost generality or for a complete list
of pricing formulas that could be obtained using the methods developed in the
present article. Most credit derivatives on two underlyings with time-dependent
payoffs can actually be priced using our results. The exercise of deriving the
corresponding formulas is left to the interested reader.
2 Modeling two dimensional default risk.
Recall that we are interested in modeling the counterparty risk on a credit risk
transaction. This involves (in general and depending of the particular features of
the transaction) the computation of various joint laws. For example, for a vanilla
credit default swap, the computation relies on the distribution of the default
time of the counterparty and the conditional distribution (w.r. to the default
of the counterparty) of the values of the CDS contract. The same methodology
can be applied to the valuation of first-to-default contracts on two underlyings
when the payoff is time-dependent (see section 4 of the present article; the
time-independent case has been addressed in [8, 17, 13]).
We follow Merton’s structural approach to risk, where the default of a com-
pany is triggered by its firm value falling below a threshold (see [12] or e.g. [4,
Chap. 3]). It is well-known that the original Merton methodology, where the
threshold is determined by the firm’s liabilities, as well as its natural refinements
such as the Black-Cox first passage time formulas [3], give qualitatively good
but numerically poor results. For example, the structural method will rank cor-
rectly the risks of two companies but will not be able to predict the spreads of
the corresponding CDS. For pricing purposes, the correct way to use the Merton
and Black-Cox models is to calibrate their parameters on the market prices of
the securities issued by the companies. Doing so insures that the models price
correctly the risk. This is the ground for their various uses, either in credit risk
measurement (think to the Basel 2 Vasicek-type large pool formulas [15, 9]),
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either for pricing purposes (think to the one-factor Gaussian copula model for
CDO tranches [14]).
Notice that the computations we are interested in require to go beyond
the existing formulas for two-dimensional credit risk in the structural approach
[8, 17, 13]. Indeed, the formulas in these articles rely mainly on the computation
of the probability that one (and only one) out of two firms defaults or that the
two firms default before a given maturity, whereas pricing counterparty risk for
a CDS transaction requires (among others) the exact knowledge of default times
distributions.
We have tried to keep some balance between generality and the choice of too
restrictive assumptions. Notice that the model may be simplified by selecting a
suitable subset of meaningful parameters, depending on the particular situations
and/or the available set of data. In the end, the model we use is as follows.
We label 1 and 2 the two default-prone entities. In view of applications to
counterparty risk, the counterparty will be labelled 2. We write τ1 (resp. τ2) for
the random time when the first (resp. second) entity defaults. Since we work
in the structural model, defaults are triggered when two log-normal processes
V1 and V2 associated respectively to the first and second entity fall below a
barrier process. As in Black-Cox [3], we assume that the barrier is described by
a time-dependent deterministic process vi(t) := Kie
γit. At last, we assume that
the risk-neutral dynamics of the processes V1 and V2 are given by:
dVi(t)
Vi(t)
= (r − ki)dt+ σidBi(t),
where r is the constant short-term interest rate and Bi, i = 1, 2 are two Brown-
ian motions. The coefficient ki is a payout ratio representing net payouts/inflows
by the firm, see e.g. the account of Merton’s approach in [4, Chap.2]. Notice
that we use a risk-neutral dynamics since we are interested in pricing formulas,
but the same construction holds with a real-life dynamics (just replace r − ki
by the drift under the historical probability).
At last, we assume that the Brownian motions B1 and B2 are correlated:
Cov(B1(t), B2(t)) = ̺t. This is an important assumption that reflects the fact
that the counterparty of a CDS transaction is usually a well-rated company
that will not default excepted in a very bad macroeconomic environment. In
particular, if the counterparty defaults, one may expect CDS spread on other
entities to widen considerably simultaneously. This phenomenon is accounted
for by a positive correlation coefficient. It is the main reason, together with
the dynamical aspects of the problem, why simplistic counterparty risk models
fail, both theoretically and empirically, to account for counterparty-driven loss
expectations on derivative contracts.
3 Counterparty risk
In this section, we derive a closed formula for the counterparty default leg of a
CDS contract, that is the present value (PV) of the expected losses on a vanilla
single-name credit derivative transaction due to the default of the protection
seller. Notice that the notion of counterparty default leg should not be confused
with the usual notion of default leg for a CDS contract, that is, the present value
of future payments by the protection seller.
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We follow standard market practices. Namely, we assume that the CDS
contract has a notional value C and that, if the underlying entity defaults, the
buyer of protection receives (1−Ru) ·C from the seller of protection, where Ru
stands for the recovery rate of the underlying entity. Similarly, if the counter-
party (the protection seller) defaults at t on the CDS contract, we assume that
the buyer of protection receives (1−Rc) ·V +t , where V +t = sup(0, Vt) stands for
the positive part of the market value of the CDS contract at t, and where Rc
stands for the counterparty recovery rate. The present moment is normalized
to t = 0 in what follows, it may or may not coincide with the inception of the
CDS contract.
3.1 Counterparty default leg
Using the joint law of the default time of the counterparty and of the underlying
entity for the CDS, we compute the default probability of the underlying entity
conditional to the default of the counterparty, and obtain a closed formula for
the counterparty default leg.
The coupon payments rate (CDS spread) by the protection buyer is written s.
We assume continuous payments of the fees: in practice, fees are payed quarterly
(and sometimes semi-annually), but due to the payments-in-arrears conventions,
the continuous payments assumption is a reasonable one. It is usually defined,
at inception of the contract, by equalizing the fee and default legs of the CDS
contract (see Section 3.3. Some empirical adjustment is sometimes done for
the counterparty default risk, taking into account advanced risk management
parameters such as netting agreements. Our computation of the counterparty
default leg leads to a new, sounder, methodology, to assess the fair value of this
adjustment.
First, the theoretical counterparty default leg Dc is given by
Dc = (1−Rc) ·E[e−rτ2 · sup(0, p(V1(τ2), τ2))1τ2<(T∧τ1)]
where p(V1(τ2), τ2) is the market price of the CDS contract at t = τ2 (when
τ1 ≥ τ2). The value p(V1(τ2), τ2) is obtained as the difference between the
default and fee legs, that is:
p(V1(τ2), τ2) = Dl(V1(τ2), τ2)− sC
r
·E[(1 − e−r((T∧τ1)−τ2))1τ1≥τ2 |Fτ2 ]
where we write Ft, as usual, for the natural filtration of the probability space
underlying the two Brownian motions B1(t), B2(t).
Notice that the term T ∧ τ1 can be, in most situations, safely replaced by T
in the previous expansion. This is because, for standard values for the spreads
and implied default probabilities in single-name default risk computations, the
computation of the fee leg conditional to the hypothesis that no default occurs
is a good first-order approximation to the unconditional fee leg. The following
computations could be simplified accordingly.
Now, the value of Dl(V1(τ2), τ2) is given by:
Dl(V1(τ2), τ2) = E[C(1 −Ru)e−r(τ1−τ2)1τ2≤τ1≤T |Fτ2 ]
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Theorem 3.1 The counterparty default leg Dc is given by:
Dc = C(1−Rc)
∗E
[
1τ2<(T∧τ1)
(
e−rτ2(1−Ru+s
r
)
(
e−µτ2 (β−α)N(
−µτ2 − α(T − τ2)√
T − τ2
)+e−µτ2(β+α)N(
−µτ2 + α(T − τ2)√
T − τ2
)
)
−s
r
(
1−e−r(T−τ2)
(
1−N(−µτ2 − β(T − τ2)√
T − τ2
)−e−2µτ2βN(−µτ2 + β(T − τ2)√
T − τ2
)
)))
+
]
where ν1 := r − k1 − γ1 − 12σ21 , α :=
√
ν21
σ21
+ 2r, β := ν1σ1 , µτ2 :=
ln(
V1(τ2)
v1(τ2)
)
σ1
.
Indeed,
p(V1(τ2), τ2)1τ2<(T∧τ1) = C1τ2<(T∧τ1)E
[
(1−Ru)e−r(τ1−τ2)1τ2≤τ1<T −
s
r
1τ2<τ1
+
s
r
e−r(τ1−τ2)1τ2≤τ1<T +
s
r
e−r(T−τ2)1τ2≤T<τ1 |Fτ2
]
and therefore
p(V1(τ2), τ2)1τ2<(T∧τ1) = C1τ2<(T∧τ1)
(
E
[
(1−Ru+s
r
)e−r(τ1−τ2)1τ2≤τ1<T |Fτ2
]
−E
[s
r
1τ2<τ1 |Fτ2
]
+E
[s
r
e−r(T−τ2)1τ2≤T<τ1 |Fτ2
])
.
The Theorem follows by standard computations of integrals over Gaussian
densities that are sketched in the Appendix 1.
3.2 Explicit formulas
Recall that τi = inf{t, Vi(t) ≤ Kieγit}. The condition Vi(t) ≤ Kieγit can be
rewritten: Wi(t) ≥ yi0, where Wi(t) = ln(Kie
γit
Vi(t)
)− ln( KiVi(0) ) and yi0 = ln Vi(0)−
ln Ki. Equivalently, Wi(t) is the diffusion process:
dWi(t) = −νit− σidBi(t),
with Wi(0) = 0 and νi := r − ki − γi − 12σ2i .
Let us define Z(t) by:
Z(t) = (Z1(t), Z2(t))
∗ =
1√
1− ̺2
(
σ−11 −̺σ−12
0
√
1− ̺2σ−12
)(
y10 −W1(t)
y20 −W2(t)
)
.
We get:
dZ1(t) = φ1dt+ dX1(t), dZ2(t) = φ2dt+ dX2(t),
where X(t) is a standard planar Brownian motion and
φ1 =
ν1σ2 − ν2σ1̺
σ1σ2
√
1− ̺2 , φ2 =
ν2
σ2
.
In particular, Z(t) is a 2-dim. Brownian motion with drift and the barrier
conditions Vi(t) = vi(t) now read: Z2(t) = 0 and
√
1− ̺2Z1(t) + ̺Z2(t) = 0.
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We want to compute the default leg Dc, that is, equivalently:
E[h(B1(τ2), τ2)1τ2≤(T∧τ1)] = E[h˜(Z1(τ2), τ2)1τ2≤(T∧τ1)]
=
∫ T
0
∫ +∞
0
h˜(r, s)P (τ2 ∈ ds, Z1(τ2) ∈ da)dsda
where h(x, t) :=(
e−rt(1−Ru+s
r
)
(
e−µx,t(β−α)N(
−µx,t − α(T − t)√
T − t )+e
−µx,t(β+α)N(
−µx,t + α(T − t)√
T − t )
)
−s
r
(
1−e−r(T−t)
(
1−N(−µx,t − β(T − t)√
T − t )−e
−2µx,tβN(
−µx,t + β(T − t)√
T − t )
)))
+
,
µx,t := σ
−1
1 (ν1t+σ1x+lnV1(0)−lnK1) and h˜(z, t) = h(−y
1
0−ν1t
σ1
+
√
1− ρ2 ·z, t).
Applying the Girsanov theorem, (Z1(t), Z2(t))
∗ is a classical Brownian motion
for the probability law Q:
dQ
dP
= e−φ1X1(T )−φ2X2(T )−[
φ21
2 +
φ22
2 ]T Pa.s.
Let r0e
iθ0 := Z1(0) + iZ2(0) =
y10σ2−̺y20σ1
σ1σ2
√
1−̺2
+ i
y20
σ2
.
Lemma 3.2 We have, for (a, 0) ∈ R2 s.t. a > 0 :
P(τ2 ∈ dt, τ2 = τ2 ∧ τ1, Z1(τ2) ∈ da) = eφ1(a−r0 cos(θ0))−φ2r0 sin(θ0)−
||~φ||2t
2
π
α2ta
e−(a
2+r20)/2t
∞∑
n=0
n sin
nπθ0
α
Inπ/α(
ar0
t
)dadt.
where ||~φ||2 := φ21 + φ22, α := arcsin(̺) + π2 and Inπ/α is the modified Bessel
function of index nπ/α.
The Lemma follows from Thm. in Appendix 2 (up to a straightforward
adaptation since we consider here a polyhedral domain D := {(x, y) ∈ R2|y ≥
0,
√
1− ̺2x+ ̺y ≥ 0} with a horizontal lower –instead of an upper– boundary,
so that the signs have to be changed accordingly in the formulas).
Indeed, according to [5] (see also [13, pp.697]), we have, for (a, b) in a neigh-
borhood of (a, 0) with b > 0:
f(a, b, t)dadb = Q(Z(t) ∈ (da, db), τ1 ∧ τ2 > t)
=
2µ
αt
e−(µ
2+r20)/2t
∞∑
n=0
sin
nπθ
α
sin
nπθ0
α
Inπ/α(
µr0
t
)dµdθ,
where θ := arctg( ba), µ :=
√
a2 + b2. Therefore, we have:
Q(τ2 = τ2 ∧ τ1, τ2 ∈ dt, Z1(τ2) ∈ da) = π
α2ta
e−(a
2+r20)/2t
∞∑
n=0
n sin
nπθ0
α
Inπ/α(
ar0
t
)dadt,
and the proof follows.
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Theorem 3.3 The counterparty default leg Dc of the CDS is given by:
Dc = C(1−Rc)
∫ T
0
∫ +∞
0
h˜(µ, t)eφ1(µ−r0 cos(θ0))−φ2r0 sin(θ0)−
||~φ||2t
2
π
α2tµ
e−(µ
2+r20)/2t
∞∑
n=0
n sin
nπθ0
α
Inπ/α(
µr0
t
)dtdµ.
Notice that although involving a double integral on Gaussian densities and
Bessel function (which asymptotic behavior is well-understood, making numer-
ical approximations easy and efficient), this kind of higher order integrals is
highly familiar in physics (heat conduction in solids, cross-sections computa-
tions, acoustics...) and can be handled efficiently. However these techniques are
not, for the time being, of our competence, and we postpone to further work the
numerical analysis of the problem. For the use of Bessel functions in physics,
we refer to the classical treatises such as [5, 7, 16].
3.3 Fair price of a CDS
In this section, we take advantage of our computation of the counterparty default
leg to compute the fair price of a CDS contract at an arbitrary time (normalized
again to t = 0 in this section) between the inception of the contract and its
maturity T . As usual, it is obtained as difference between the default and fee
legs, but, contrary to the usual pricing formulas, we take into account exactly
the effect of the counterparty default leg.
Notice that we insist in deriving exact formulas but, for practical purposes,
it may be convenient to use the standard approximation schemes to simplify
the use of the formulas and fasten the computations. For example, in order to
compute the fee leg, it may be convenient to assume that defaults can occur
only at times ti, i = 1...n, so that the following integral expressions can be
safely replaced by finite sums involving only the computation of the default
probabilities P(τ1 ∧ τ2 ≤ t).
Let us writeDs for the “standard” default leg of the CDS, that is, the present
value of the cash-flows corresponding to payments by the seller of protection if
there is a default occurring on the assets underlying the CDS contract. The
total default leg Dtot of the CDS contract is given by the sum Ds +Dc, where
Dc is given by Thm. 3.3.
Lemma 3.4 The standard default leg is given by:
Ds = C(1−Ru)
∫ T
0
∫ +∞
0
eφ1(µ cos(α)−r0 cos(θ0))+φ2(µ sin(α)−r0 sin(θ0))−
||~φ||2T
2
π
α2tµ
e−(µ
2+r20)/2t
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n+1n sin nπθ0
α
Inπ/α(
µr0
t
)dµdt
The proof follows from the same reasoning as the one of Lemma 3.2 and can
be omitted.
Notice that:
Q(τ1 ∈ dt, τ1 = τ1 ∧ τ2, Z1(t) + iZ2(t) = dµ · eiα) =
7
πα2tµ
e−(µ
2+r20)/2t
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n+1n sin nπθ0
α
Inπ/α(
µr0
t
)dµdt
Let us write s for the spread of the CDS contract (the continuous coupon
rate served by the protection buyer to the protection seller, till the end of the
contract, or the default of the underlying, or the default of the protection seller);
s is fixed at inception of the contract and remains constant till the maturity T .
Recall that the fee leg of a credit derivative contract is the present value of
cumulated payments by the protection buyer. We write from now on τ for
τ1 ∧ τ2.
Lemma 3.5 The fee leg F of the CDS contract is given by:
Fs−1 =
1− e−rT
r
P(τ ≥ T ) + E[ 1− e
−rτ
r
1τ≤T ]
=
1− e−rT
r
∫ ∞
0
∫ α
0
eφ1(µ cos(κ)−r0 cos(θ0))+φ2(µ sin(κ)−r0 sin(θ0))−
||~φ||2T
2
2µ
αT
e−(µ
2+r20)/2T
∞∑
n=1
sin
nπκ
α
sin
nπθ0
α
Inπ/α(
µr0
T
)dµdκ
+
∫ T
0
∫ +∞
0
1− e−rt
r
eφ1(µ cos(α)−r0 cos(θ0))+φ2(µ sin(α)−r0 sin(θ0))−
||~φ||2T
2
π
α2tµ
e−(µ
2+r20)/2t
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n+1n sin nπθ0
α
Inπ/α(
µr0
t
)dµdt
+
∫ T
0
∫ +∞
0
1− e−rt
r
eφ1(µ−r0 cos(θ0))−φ2r0 sin(θ0)−
||~φ||2t
2
π
α2tµ
e−(µ
2+r20)/2t
∞∑
n=0
n sin
nπθ0
α
Inπ/α(
µr0
t
)dtdµ
The first term was computed in [13, p.698], the last two follow from our
previous computations.
Theorem 3.6 The fair price of a CDS, taking into account the counterparty
risk, is given by:
Dtot − F
where F and Dtot are given by the previous Lemmas.
4 First-to-default on two underlyings
As was mentioned in the introduction, most credit derivative transactions on
two default-prone instruments with time-dependent payoffs can be priced using
the techniques developed in the present article. As an example, we derive the
fair spread of a first-to-default contract on two underlyings.
Most notations are as above, when we were dealing with the counterparty
risk on a CDS, and we do not recall them excepted when necessary. The only
difference is that, now, the two default-prone entities are treated on the same
footing. We still write C for the notional value of the contract and assume a
given recovery rate R (e.g. 40%) so that, at the first default occuring before the
maturity of the contract, the buyer of protection will receive C(1 − R) (recall
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this is the very definition of a first-to-default contract; on the other hand, the
buyer of protection pays a continuous fee -still called the “spread”- till the first
default occurs or till the maturity of the contract if no default occurs before the
maturity).
Lemma 4.1 The default leg of the contract is given by:
D = C(1−R)[
∫ T
0
∫ +∞
0
e−rteφ1(µ cos(α)−r0 cos(θ0))+φ2(µ sin(α)−r0 sin(θ0))−
||~φ||2T
2
π
α2tµ
e−(µ
2+r20)/2t
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n+1n sin nπθ0
α
Inπ/α(
µr0
t
)dµdt
+
∫ T
0
∫ +∞
0
e−rteφ1(µ−r0 cos(θ0))−φ2r0 sin(θ0)−
||~φ||2t
2
π
α2tµ
e−(µ
2+r20)/2t
∞∑
n=0
n sin
nπθ0
α
Inπ/α(
µr0
t
)dtdµ]
On the other hand, the fee leg is given by the same formula as in Lemma 3.5
-this is because the coupon is served by the protection buyer till a first default
occur in both cases (a CDS with counterparty risk or a first-to-default swap on
two underlyings).
Theorem 4.2 The fair spread s of a first-to-default swap on two underlyings
at inception of the contract is given by
s =
D
F ′
where D is given by Lemma 4.1 and F ′ = Fs−1 by Lemma 3.5.
5 Appendix 1: Theoretical default legs for CDS
We include in this section a proof of the formulas for the market price of a CDS
conditional to the default of the counterparty. These are classical computations
and/or variations thereof. We give therefore only short indications and refer to
[4, Chap. 3] for further details.
The notations are as in Section 3; N stands as usual for the cumulated
standard normal distribution.
Lemma 5.1 On the set τ2 < τ1, we have:
P (τ1 ≤ T |Fτ2) = N(
−Yτ2 − ν1(T − τ2)
σ1
√
T − τ2
) + e−2ν1σ
−2
1 Yτ2N(
−Yτ2 + ν1(T − τ2)
σ1
√
T − τ2
),
where Yt := ln(
V1(t)
v1(t)
) = ln(V1(0)K1 ) + ν1t+ σ1B1(t), ν1 := r − k1 − γ1 − 12σ21.
The lemma is a direct application of Cor. 3.1.1 in [4].
Lemma 5.2 For a, b, c ∈ R with b < 0 and c2 > a:∫ y
0
eaxdN(
b− cx√
x
) =
d+ c
2d
g(y) +
d− c
2d
h(y)
with d =
√
c2 − 2a, g(y) := eb(c−d)N( b−dy√y ), h(y) := eb(c+d)N( b+dy√y ).
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See Lemma 3.2.1, Fla. 3.16 in [4].
Corollary 5.3 We have, on τ1 > τ2:
E[e−r(τ1−τ2)1τ1<s|Fτ2 ] =
= e−µτ2 (β−α)N(
−µτ2 − α(s− τ2)√
s− τ2 ) + e
−µτ2(β+α)N(
−µτ2 + α(s − τ2)√
s− τ2 ),
where α :=
√
ν21
σ21
+ 2r, β := ν1σ1 , µτ2 :=
Yτ2
σ1
.
Indeed by the previous lemmas,
E[e−r(τ1−τ2)1τ1<T |Fτ2 ] =
∫ T
τ2
e−r(s−τ2)dP (τ1 ≤ s|Fτ2)
=
∫ T
τ2
e−r(s−τ2)[dN(
−Yτ2 − ν1(s− τ2)
σ1
√
s− τ2 ) + e
−2ν1σ−21 Yτ2dN(
−Yτ2 + ν1(s− τ2)
σ1
√
s− τ2 )]
=
α+ β
2α
e−µτ2 (β−α)N(
−µτ2 − α(T − τ2)√
T − τ2
)+
α− β
2α
e−µτ2(β+α)N(
−µτ2 + α(T − τ2)√
T − τ2
)+
+e−2ν1σ
−2
1 Yτ2 [
α− β
2α
e−µτ2 (−β−α)N(
−µτ2 − α(T − τ2)√
T − τ2
)+
α+ β
2α
e−µτ2(−β+α)N(
−µτ2 + α(T − τ2)√
T − τ2
)],
and the formula follows.
6 Appendix 2: First hitting time in a polyhedral
domain
Our results rely largely on the following two-dimensional extension of a Theorem
of Daniels, see [6, Fla 3.1]. This natural extension is important in view of
applications to multidimensional Brownian processes, particularly in the setting
of credit risk. It was first announced without a proof in [11] and could be easily
extended to higher dimensional cases. We could not find a proof in the literature,
and include therefore a short demonstration in this appendix.
Let Z
(x0,y0)
t (abbreviated to Zt when no confusion can arise), a planar Brown-
ian starting at (x0, y0) evolving in a polyhedral domainD with absorbing bound-
ary ∂D. We write τ for the first hitting time of the boundary and f(x0, y0, x, y, t)
(abbreviated to f(x, y, t) when no confusion can arise) for the density of the sur-
viving process:
f(x, y, t)dxdy := P (Zt ∈ (dx, dy), τ > t)
We look for the distribution of hitting times: P (τ ∈ dt, Zτ ∈ dp), dp ∈ ∂D
and can assume (up to a planar rotation) that ∂D is horizontal and an upper
boundary for D in the neighborhood of p, so that dp is a horizontal line element:
dp = (da, b), with p = (a, b) ∈ ∂D.
Theorem 6.1 We have:
P (τ ∈ dt, Zτ = (da, b)) = −1
2
∂
∂b
f(a, b, t)dadt. (1)
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Sketch of the proof : Let us write φ(x, y,∆t)dadt for P (τ ∈ dt, Zτ ∈
(da, b)|Zt−∆t = (x, y)), where in practice we will choose ∆t << 1 and study
the asymptotics when ∆t goes to 0. From Daniels’ theorem [6, Fla 3.1] which
computes the first exit density for a one-dimensional BM, together with the
independence of the horizontal and vertical components of a two-dimensional
BM, we get, in a neighborhood of (a, b):
φ(x, y,∆t) ∼= 1
2π∆t2
exp− (a− x)
2
2∆t
· exp− (b− y)
2
2∆t
· (b− y)
Then,
P (τ ∈ dt, Zτ ∈ (da, b))da−1dt−1 =
∫
D
f(x, y, t−∆t)φ(x, y,∆t)dxdy
∼=
∫
D
[f(a, y, t−∆t)+(x−a)f ′x(a, y, t−∆t)+
(x− a)2
2
f ′′x (a, y, t−∆t)]φ(x, y,∆t)dxdy
By symmetry, in a neighborhood of (a, b) in D, φ(x, y,∆t) ∼= φ(2a−x, y,∆t),
so that the second term of the expansion vanishes. Since ∂D is an absorbing
boundary, f(a, b, t−∆t) = f ′x(a, b, t−∆t) = f ′′x (a, b, t−∆t) = 0 and the third
term reads:∫
D
(x− a)2
2
f ′′x (a, y, t−∆t)φ(x, y,∆t)dxdy ∼= −
1
∆t
∫ +∞
−∞
(x− a)2
2
1√
2π∆t
e−
(x−a)2
2∆t dx
∗
∫ b
−∞
(b− y)2 1√
2π∆t
e−
(b−y)2
2∆t
∂f ′′x
∂y
(a, b, t−∆t)dy
= O(∆t)
Similarly, the first term reads:
∫
D
f(a, y, t−∆t)φ(x, y,∆t)dxdy ∼=
∫ b
−∞
(b− y)√
2π∆t3/2
e−
(b−y)2
2dt f(a, y, t−∆t)dy
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2π∆t1/2
e−
(x−a)2
2∆t dx
=
∫ b
−∞
(b− y)√
2π∆t3/2
e−
(b−y)2
2∆t f(a, y, t−∆t)dy
= −
∫ b
−∞
(b− y)2√
2π∆t3/2
e−
(b−y)2
2∆t f ′y(a, b, t−∆t)dy
= −1
2
f ′y(a, b, t−∆t)
The Theorem follows.
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